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I. Introduction 
Models of corporate and investor behavior by 
Myers and Majluf (1984) John and Williams 
(1985), Miller and Rock (1985), and Korajczyk, 
Lucas, and McDonald (1991) provide theoretical 
support for a relationship between the announce- 
ment effect of a common stock issue and infor- 
mation released by current period dividends or 
earnings announcements. Disclosure models by 
Verrecchia (1990) and an earnings timing model 
discussed in Trueman (1990) also lead to possible 
timing behavior around security offerings. These 
studies hypothesize that the firms' announce- 
ments change the information set available to eq- 
uity investors, resulting in reevaluation of the 
firm's stock price. 
The first goal of this article is to determine 
whether investors react differently to a security 
issue announcement that closely precedes earn- 
ings and dividend information versus offer an- 
nouncements made recently after dividend and 
earnings releases. A corollary aim is to deter- 
mine whether some managers time equity or debt 
The valuation effect of 
debt and equity issue 
announcements on 
stock price varies pre- 
dictably with the timing 
of earnings and divi- 
dend reports. Issue an- 
nouncements closely 
preceding current cash 
flow signals have more 
negative valuation ef- 
fects. Straight debt an- 
nouncements also have 
a significantly negative 
effect on stock price, 
when the offer an- 
nouncement closely 
precedes earnings and 
dividend releases. The 
evidence is consistent 
with a separating equi- 
librium where better 
performing firms signal 
superior value by an- 
nouncing equity offers 
shortly after dividend 
announcements. Poorer 
performers appear to 
time equity offers just 
before dividend signals, 
which in turn are more 
likely to be negative. 
(Journal of Business, 1993, vol. 66, no. 4) 
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issue announcements to occur soon after favorable periodic (quarterly) 
announcements while other managers announce issues before release 
of unfavorable periodic information. The occurrence of either phenom- 
enon would support the central objective of this article: to examine 
whether a separating equilibrium between better and poorer per- 
forming companies may exist. 
This study draws on and extends similar empirical work by Korajc- 
zyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1991) and Dierkens (1991). Korajczyk, 
Lucas, and McDonald (1991) (KLM) show that the equity issue an- 
nouncement price decline is directly related to the amount of informa- 
tion asymmetry. Consequently, firms are more likely to issue equity 
when information asymmetry is lowest. This condition occurs immedi- 
ately after an informative announcement, such as earnings. The longer 
the elapsed time since the last information release, the greater the 
potential information asymmetry. This implies that the price decline 
at an equity issue announcement date is an increasing function of the 
time in days since the last regular quarterly earnings announcement. 
In the KLM framework, the longer the time since the last earnings 
release, the more likely the issuing firm is of lower quality. They find a 
statistically weak linear relationship between the equity announcement 
abnormal return and the interval since the last earnings release. We 
document a stronger relationship between the price response of an 
equity issue announcement and the availability of prior dividend and 
earnings information. We also show that common stock abnormal re- 
turns associated with straight debt offer announcements reflect the 
timing of the firm's earnings and dividend announcements. Abnormal 
returns for straight debt offerings are significantly different from zero 
only when the offer announcement is not closely preceded by the earn- 
ings and dividend announcements.1 
Dierkens (1991) also finds that the price decrease associated with 
an equity issue is directly related to various measures of information 
asymmetry. Since the level of asymmetry may be reduced by earnings 
releases that closely precede equity offers, a clustering of security 
offer announcements would be expected shortly after current earnings 
announcements. Both Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald and Dierkens 
find this phenomenon. Also, Dierkens reports that firms with greater 
information asymmetry are more likely to issue equity soon after an 
1. Myers and Majluf (1984) predict an insignificant abnormal return for announce- 
ments of riskless debt offerings and a negative abnormal return for risky debt. Previous 
research has generally not supported the prediction for risky straight debt. Our results 
are also consistent with Kross and Schroeder (1984) and Penman (1987), who report 
that investors revise earnings expectations downward when managers delay announce- 
ment of unfavorable earnings. Asquith and Mullins (1986), Eckbo (1986), Masulis and 
Korwar (1986), Mikkelson and Partch (1986), and Kalay and Shimrat (1987) document 
the effect of security issues on stock value. 
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earnings release. Both studies find that earnings announcements pre- 
ceding an equity issue are more informative than earnings announce- 
ments following an equity issue. We document similar clustering of 
both debt and equity offer announcements after dividend and earnings 
releases; however, we find no differences in the informativeness of 
pre- versus postissue earnings. This result is consistent with Healy 
and Palepu (1987, 1990), who find no relationship between equity offer 
announcements and subsequent changes in earnings. Brous (1992) also 
reports that equity announcements do not signal a downward revision 
in analysts' earnings forecasts. Alternatively, Hansen and Crutchley 
(1990) show that external financing announcements signal long-term 
earnings declines. 
The predictions of the KLM and Dierkens models should hold with 
any information release, though their empirical tests consider only the 
effect of earnings announcements. The current study considers the 
conditioning effect of both dividend and earnings releases on equity 
and debt offer announcements.2 Equity and debt offer abnormal re- 
turns are more negative for longer intervals between the offer an- 
nouncement and the prior release of dividend information. Subsequent 
dividend changes are more likely to be negative when equity (but not 
debt) issue announcements are more distant from prior dividend an- 
nouncements. These results are consistent with managerial timing and 
investors' reactions provided by Kalay and Loewenstein (1985), who 
show that managers tend to postpone decreases in dividends. Abnor- 
mal returns for equity offer announcements are not affected by the 
timing of the earnings release. Thus, the equity issue announcement 
timing appears to contain a dividend information effect but not an 
earnings information effect. Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald's find- 
ing of an earnings effect may reflect the dividend phenomenon since 
they did not specifically control for dividends. Consistent with their 
earnings information effect, we do find a significant earnings release 
effect of the appropriate sign with debt issues. 
Our results support the implications of the John and Williams (1985) 
model, where higher-quality firms signal their value by paying larger 
dividends. The dividend payment signals the firm's true value, re- 
sulting in a higher stock price.3 This model implies that security issue 
2. Ball and Brown (1968) and Rendleman, Jones, and Latane (1982) show a direct 
relationship between common stock price changes and the announcement of unexpected 
earnings. Charest (1978), Aharony and Swary (1980), Kwan (1981), Asquith and Mullins 
(1983), Brickley (1983), Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984), Fehrs, Benesh, and Peterson 
(1988), and Lang and Litzenberger (1989) support the information content of dividend 
announcements. Kane, Lee, and Marcus (1984) provide evidence of signaling interac- 
tions between earnings and dividends announcements. 
3. Also see Ambarish, John, and Williams (1987). For our purposes, either model 
yields similar implications. 
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announcements with distant prior dividend releases are likely to be less 
well received than issue announcements that closely follow "good" 
dividend signals. Loderer and Mauer (1992) test this implication by 
examining managerial timing of equity announcements relative to the 
dividend announcement. They find that firms issuing equity are not 
more likely to pay a dividend than nonissuing firms. Their sample tests 
also show that firms tend to issue equity after dividend announcements 
rather than before, but they argue that this may be coincidental. Lod- 
erer and Mauer (1992) find no association between the timing of the 
dividend announcement and the equity announcement abnormal re- 
turn. They also find no relationship between the sign of Miller and 
Rock's (1985) net dividend and the equity announcement date abnor- 
mal return. Hence, they interpret their work as providing little support 
for either the John and Williams or the Miller and Rock models. 
The current study finds a more negative issue announcement valua- 
tion effect when the offer announcement closely precedes the current 
period dividend announcement. Negative dividend changes also occur 
more frequently when the equity offer announcement precedes the 
dividend release. We do not directly test the appropriateness of spe- 
cific signaling models or attempt to distinguish between them. A gen- 
eral implication of several signaling models is examined on whether 
investor's offer announcements reactions differ in a predictable man- 
ner when information asymmetry levels differ between investors and 
managers. 
Section II provides hypotheses concerning the conditional signaling 
environment tested. Section III outlines the sample selection proce- 
dure, methodology, and descriptive statistics of the samples. Section 
IV presents the results for both the stock and debt sample and exam- 
ines differences in earnings and dividend changes based on signal se- 
quence. Section V concludes the article. An Appendix outlines the 
nature of revealing signals in a simple Miller and Rock (1985) frame- 
work. 
II. Testable Implications of the Effect of Signal Sequence 
The information effect of a given signal is a function of the signal 
content and (we hypothesize) the signal's sequence relative to the an- 
nouncement of other information releases. We test whether releasing 
the earnings and dividend information to the public shortly before the 
offer announcement changes how investors interpret the announce- 
ment of a security offering. Whether or not the effect of signal se- 
quence is significant is an open empirical question. If dividend, earn- 
ing, and security issue signals partially reveal each other, the 
information content of a subsequent signal will be related to (1) the 
unexpected signal content, (2) the sequence of release in the set of 
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signals, and (3) the elapsed time interval since the release of prior 
signals. Tests used by Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1991) implic- 
itly assume that inside information is received' uniformly over time by 
managers. Thus, the relationship between the time interval between 
fully (or partially) revealing signals and the information content of the 
subsequent signal would be linearly related. The primary methodology 
of this study avoids this potentially limiting assumption. 
Earnings and dividend signals for dividend paying firms occur regu- 
larly through time. A security issue announcement, thereby, both pre- 
cedes and follows these other signals. However, managers can time 
the security issue announcement relative to these regularly announced 
signals. An operational definition of "signal sequencing" is used in 
this study to capture this timing relationship. If the chronologically 
closest earnings (dividend) announcement in the time series of such 
announcements is prior to the security issue announcement, the earn- 
ings (dividend) announcement is defined as a prior announcement. If 
the chronologically closest earnings or dividend announcement to the 
security issue announcement is after the security announcement, the 
earnings (or dividend) announcement is defined as occurring after 
the issue announcement. 
There are eight possible combinations of the sequence of announce- 
ments considered in this study. To simplify the analysis, the four port- 
folios presented in table 1 are formed. Portfolio 1 consists of observa- 
tions where the announcement of earnings (X) and dividends (D) 
precedes the security (B) announcement. This portfolio includes three 
possible chronological sequences, (X - D - B), (D - X - B), and ([X D] 
- B), where the brackets enclose simultaneous announcements.4 We 
hypothesize that the X and D signals in this portfolio are partially 
revealing of B, and the absolute value of the observed abnormal return 
associated with B is reduced by the preceding signals. 
Portfolio 2 consists of the sequence (X - B - D) where the earnings 
announcement precedes the offer announcement and the dividend an- 
nouncement follows the offer announcement. If earnings completely 
reveal B as in the single-period model of Miller and Rock (1985), the 
average security announcement effects observed for portfolios 1 and 
2 should be identical since in both cases X precedes B. If D contains 
information about B not revealed by X, the informativeness of B in 
portfolio 2 may be larger than in portfolio 1 since in 2 the information 
4. Observations with multiple events on the security announcement date are elimi- 
nated. Thus, the combinations excluded contain ([X D B]), ([X B] - D), (D - [X B]), 
([D B] - X), and (X - [D B]). In each of these combinations, the marginal informativeness 
of B is unobtainable due to the simultaneous occurrence of at least one other signal. In 
addition, the sequences [(B - X - D) and (B - D - X)], as well as [(X - D - B) and (D - 
X - B)], are considered equivalent since only the effect of the combination of X and D 
on B is examined. 
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TABLE 1 Portfolio Partitions by Sequence of Events 
D Precedes B D Follows B 
X precedes B Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 
Sequences* (X - D - B) (X - B - D) 
([X D] - B) 
(D - X - B) 
Relative effect on B B partially B partially 
revealed by X and D revealed by X 
X follows B Portfolio 3 Portfolio 4 
Sequences* (D - B - X) (B - X - D) 
(B - D - X) 
(B - [X D]) 
Relative effect on B B partially No prior signal 
revealed by D reveals B 
NOTE.-Relative hypothesized security announcement effects are separated into four portfolios 
based on different levels of expected information that result from the sequence of partially revealing 
adjacent announcements of earnings and dividends. The sequences are given in chronological order. 
Thus, (X - D - B) indicates that the earnings announcement (X) precedes the dividend announcement 
(D), while the dividend announcement also precedes the security issue announcement (B). The 
brackets enclose simultaneous announcements. 
* Sequences are omitted that include at least one other signal released simultaneously with B 
since in this case our empirical tests are unable to distinguish the relative informativeness of B. 
in D is not yet revealed. This result would be consistent with the 
predictions of John and Williams (1985).5 
Portfolio 3 consists of the sequence (D - B - X). In this case D 
partially reveals B, but information about earnings is not yet available. 
If dividends are less revealing of B than X, the information content of 
B should be greater in portfolio 3 than either portfolio 1 or 2 since in 
portfolios 1 and 2 the earnings information is already public. If X and 
D are equally revealing of B, the information content of B in 1, 2, and 
3 should be identical, ceteris paribus. Finally, in portfolio 4, B precedes 
both X and D. The possible sequences include (B - X - D), (B - D - X), 
and (B - [X D]). Since no other announcement has occurred to reveal 
B, the absolute value of the abnormal return of B should be unambigu- 
ously greater for portfolio 4 than any of the other three portfolios. 
III. Sample and Methodology 
A. Sample Selection 
The firms selected for the sample were obtained from the Registered 
Offering Statistics (ROS) tape compiled by the Securities and Ex- 
change Commission (SEC). All common stock and straight debt issues 
from 1971 through part of 1986 were initially considered. Announce- 
5. In another test (unreported), no evidence of a relationship between relative offer 
size and abnormal returns was found. Therefore, the size variable was omitted in further 
analysis. This is consistent with Dierkens's (1991) results. 
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ment dates for security issues are the earlier of (i) the day the security 
is registered with the SEC or (ii) the day the issue appears in the Wall 
Street Journal, as announced in the Wall Street Journal Index. Be- 
cause of the uncertainty in precisely identifying when the market re- 
ceives the news, the standard 2-day event period is used, consisting 
of days -1 and 0. All issue announcements from the ROS tape were 
verified with the Wall Street Journal Index. The following additional 
screens are applied. 
1. The issue is for straight debt or common stock and must be the 
only registration filed by the firm on that date. 
2. The issue is an immediate cash offering to the public. Thus, 
shelf registrations and registrations for other special purposes 
such as conversions and employee stock option plans (ESOPs) 
are eliminated. 
3. Only unregulated firms are included. Firms identified on the 
ROS tape as financial institutions, utilities, and natural gas and 
oil are omitted since managers of regulated firms often may not 
have complete control over capital structure decisions. 
4. The firm must be on the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) Daily Return Tape for 55 trading days before the 
announcement of the issue and remain on the tape for 140 
trading days following the issuance date. 
5. No other significant firm announcements occurred during the 
2-day event period. Other announcements are found in the Wall 
Street Journal Index and include major contracts, merger 
statements, management changes, and so on.6 
6. The offering must have been completed. In our samples, the 
number of withdrawn offerings is too small to allow meaningful 
analysis of these observations. 
7. Both a dividend and earnings announcement must occur within 
21/2 months, plus or minus, from the issue announcement 
date. Initially, the closest dividend and quarterly earnings 
announcement date to the issue announcement are used. The 
21/2-month restriction provides a weak constraint in excluding 
adjacent earnings and dividends that are too distant to affect or 
be affected by the issue announcement. Dividends are obtained 
from the CRSP Monthly Master Tape, Moody's Dividend 
Record, or the Wall Street Journal Index. Quarterly earnings 
information comes from COMPUSTAT, the Wall Street 
Journal Index, or Moody's Handbook of Common Stock. 
6. Results are also replicated after screening the Wall Street Journal Index to elimi- 
nate stock repurchases and debt buybacks in the quarter of security issue and in the 
quarter before and after the issue quarter. The results are not materially changed and 
are not reported. 
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B. Methodology 
The information signaled by external financing announcements also 
may be a function of the size of the adjacent signals (see Miller and 
Rock 1985). Thus, simple measures of signal size or strength are used 
in the analysis. Unexpected changes in dividends (DU) are calculated 
based on the naive model shown by Kwan (1981) to perform well as a 
forecast of dividend expectations, 
DU=DqlDq (1) 
where Dq is the quarterly dividend nearest to the security issue an- 
nouncement. Dividends are adjusted for splits and stock dividends. 
Division by zero is not a problem since all sample firms have positive 
dividends for the q - 1 period. Unexpected earnings (XU) are also 
obtained with a naive model, 
xu = XqlXq-l, (2) 
where Xq is the quarterly earnings nearest to the security issue an- 
nouncement. The absolute value of Xq - I is used in the few cases where 
Xq- 1 is negative. Tests rederived with these observations omitted pro- 
vide qualitatively similar results. 
Abnormal returns are generated via a market model using standard 
event-study methodology similar to Mikkelson and Partch (1986). Be- 
cause of the use of a 2-day event period, all time intervals in the 
estimation period are also 2-day periods.7 Each abnormal return is 
treated as a prediction error and standardized according to Johnston 
(1984). Tests of differences of portfolio average standardized predic- 
tion errors (ASPEs) between portfolios 1 through 4 are conducted us- 
ing a simple dummy variable regression on the portfolio partitions. For 
example, to determine whether ASPE, from portfolio 1 differs from 
ASPE4 for portfolio 4, the following regression is estimated, 
SPEi = a + I3bji + eji, (3) 
where observation i is in either portfolio j = 1 or 4. The value SPE1 
is the standardized prediction error for observation i, and bji is a binary 
indicator variable equal to one when observation i is drawn from port- 
folio j = 1 and equal to zero if the observation is from portfolio j = 
4. The value ASPE4 is given by a in equation (3). If the beta is signifi- 
cant, ASPE, statistically differs from ASPE4.8 The analysis is repeated 
for both the debt and equity samples for all possible pairs of portfolio 
combinations, yielding six comparisons per sample. 
7. Two-day intervals are used to assure that the expected value of the residual is zero 
conditional on no announcement. 
8. The test of the significance of beta is a two-tailed test. Adjusted p-values reflect 
the one-sided nature of our hypothesis in the abnormal returns (AR) comparisons where 
there are unambiguous predictions of the relative size of the AR. 
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C. Sample Description and Demographics 
The final sample consists of 579 straight debt offerings and 191 com- 
mon stock offerings. The distributions of offerings per year for the 
initial and screened samples are provided in table 2. The 2-day mean 
prediction error (unstandardized) for the equity issue sample is 
- 2.84% and is significant at the 1% level.9 The mean prediction error 
of -0.17% for the debt sample is not significant at the 10% level. 
These findings are consistent with prior research where equity issue 
announcements result in negative abnormal returns of about - 3% and 
straight debt issue announcements result in an insignificant mean ab- 
normal return. 
The mean dividend change for the stock sample is - 1.74% (signifi- 
cant at the 1% level), while the average dividend change is 1.87% for 
the debt sample (significant at the 10% level). The average earnings 
change for the stock sample is 9.20% (significant at the 1% level), while 
the mean earnings change in the debt sample is 1.60% (insignificant). 
Thus, stock issues on average appear to have a contemporaneous de- 
crease in dividends and an increase in earnings. Earnings increases in 
prior periods were not examined, precluding conclusions on whether 
earnings changes are different from expectations. However, since divi- 
dend decreases are uncommon (Eades, Hess, and Kim 1985), the mean 
dividend decrease for the equity sample probably does represent an 
unexpected change. 
Table 3 contains sample sizes for the four portfolio partitions. In 
both the stock and debt samples, the majority of observations, 39.3% 
and 42.7%, respectively, are found in portfolio 1, where earnings and 
dividends precede security issue announcements. A one-way chi- 
square test for both the stock (X2 = 13.248, p-value < .01) and debt 
(X2 = 54.045, p-value < .01) issue samples rejects the null of equal 
portfolio size over the four portfolios. There is some clustering of both 
types of external financing announcements after information releases. 
Loderer and Mauer (1992) point out that this does not necessarily 
imply managers voluntarily time security issues relative to earnings 
and dividend announcements for signaling reasons. The earnings, divi- 
dend, and issue decisions are often collectively made at a quarterly 
meeting of the board of directors. They argue that the issue process 
may require postponing the issue announcement until terms are final- 
ized, while there may be no reason to delay the earnings and dividend 
announcements. 
9. All tests of statistical significance involving the security announcement abnormal 
returns employ standardized prediction errors. For ease of interpretation, the associated 
unstandardized prediction errors are reported. Abnormal returns on both samples are 
also obtained using 1-day intervals over the estimation period. Both a 55-day pre- 
announcement period and a 140-day postannouncement estimation period are used. No 
material change in the results occurred. 
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TABLE 2 Number of Offerings by Year in the Preliminary and Final Samples 
Straight Debt Offers Common Stock Offers 
Year Preliminary Final Preliminary Final 
1971 62 48 85 34 
1972 28 22 50 15 
1973 17 14 7 3 
1974 47 33 6 4 
1975 75 58 17 8 
1976 40 36 31 17 
1977 31 19 10 6 
1978 41 24 22 8 
1979 36 19 19 15 
1980 86 67 29 16 
1981 48 34 21 13 
1982 101 77 14 8 
1983 55 34 50 35 
1984 41 25 8 4 
1985 60 43 4 4 
1986* 32 26 2 1 
Total 800 579 375 191 
* The number of 1986 issues is small because the Registered Offering Statistics tape available for 
this project does not include all 1986 registrations. 
TABLE 3 Sample Size of Each Portfolio Partition 
A. Common Stock Offers 
D Precedes B D Follows B Row Total 
X precedes B Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 
75 38 113 
(39.27%) (19.90%) (59.16%) 
X follows B Portfolio 3 Portfolio 4 
31 47 78 
(16.23%) (24.61%) (40.84%) 
Column total 106 85 191 
(55.50%) (44.50%) 
B. Straight Debt Offers 
D Precedes B D Follows B Row Total 
X precedes B Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 
247 93 340 
(42.66%) (16.06%) (58.72%) 
X follows B Portfolio 3 Portfolio 4 
101 138 239 
(17.44%) (23.83%) (41.28%) 
Column total 348 231 579 
(60.10%) (39.90%) 
NOTE.-Panel A consists of the breakdown of the stock sample into portfolios 1 through 4. Panel 
B presents a similar breakdown for the debt issue sample. The percentage of the total sample 
constituted by the given category is presented in parentheses beneath the sample sizes. 
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For both samples, portfolio 4 contains the next highest proportion 
of observations, where both earnings and dividends occur after the 
security issue announcement. The larger number of observations in 
portfolios 1 and 4 is not surprising since earnings and dividend an- 
nouncements are usually clustered and released after scheduled board 
meetings. 
IV. Results 
A. Signal Sequence and Equity Announcement Abnormal Returns 
The mean abnormal returns (ARs) for the four stock issue portfolios 
are presented in panel A of table 4. Each of the four portfolio ARs are 
negative and significant. The negative ARs range from an absolute 
minimum of -2.11% for portfolio 3 to an absolute maximum of 
TABLE 4 Average Prediction Errors for Equity Offers by Portfolio 
A. Portfolio Mean Abnormal Returns: Equity Offers 
D Precedes B D Follows B 
X precedes B Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 
Mean abnormal return (AR)a -.0252** -.0317** 
X follows B Portfolio 3 Portfolio 4 
Mean abnormal return (AR)a - .021 1** - .0359** 
B. Comparisons of Portfolio Mean Abnormal Returns: Equity Offers 
Portfolio Comparisons 
1-2 1-3 1-4 
D[mean abnormal return]b -.0065 .0041 -.0107* 
Portfolio Comparisons 
2-3 2-4 3-4 
D[mean abnormal return] .0106 - .0042 -.0148*b 
NOTE.-Panel A presents the mean equity abnormal returns (ARs) for the sample of equity offer- 
ings broken down by portfolio sequence. Two-day unstandardized mean ARs are reported for the 
security announcements; however, all statistical tests involving ARs are performed using mean 
standardized prediction errors. Panel B compares the mean ARs for all possible pairwise portfolio 
combinations for the stock offerings. All cell entries in panel B represent the mean of the second 
portfolio value for the variable of interest less the mean of the first portfolio value in the numbered 
comparisons. 
a Medians tests were also constructed for the AR variables with no qualitative change in results. 
b The D[ ] operator represents the difference between the means for the numbered portfolios for 
the variable in brackets. For example, the D[abnormal return] for the 1-4 comparison represents the 
mean abnormal return of portfolio 4 minus the mean abnormal return for portfolio 1. The sequential 
signaling hypothesis predicts the mean AR for portfolio 4 will be absolutely greater than the mean 
AR of portfolio 1. Since the mean AR for both portfolios are negative, the 1-4 comparison should 
be negative and significant. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
** Significant at the 1% level. 
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- 3.59% for portfolio 4. The equity announcements provide negative 
information irrespective of the timing of other signals. Panel B of table 
4 contains comparisons of differences in mean ARs between all possi- 
ble portfolio combinations (1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 2-3, 2-4, 3-4) for the stock 
issue sample. Each comparison is made by subtracting the mean AR 
of the lower number portfolio from the mean of the higher number 
portfolio. Under the sequential timing hypothesis, the absolutely small- 
est abnormal returns are expected to occur in portfolio 1. Even though 
portfolio 3 exhibits the absolutely smallest mean AR in panel A, the 
difference between 1 and 3 is not significant. The sequential timing 
hypothesis also predicts that the absolute value of the portfolio 4 mean 
AR should be greater than any of the other portfolios since B should 
be more informative when it precedes both D and X. Hence, the com- 
parisons 1-4, 2-4, and 3-4 should be negative and significant. Two of 
the three comparisons are negative and significant, while the compari- 
son 2-4 is negative but not significant. The timing of the dividend signal 
appears to "condition" the stock offering abnormal return, while the 
timing of the prior release of the earnings signal does not. 
The remaining comparisons will be significant only if information 
imparted by the prior dividend differs from information provided by 
the prior earnings. Comparison 2-3 is insignificant, though there is a 
1.06% performance disadvantage when the dividend signal is last. This 
is of the same scale as the significant 1.07% difference for comparison 
1-4. Even though not significant, the sign and size of the difference is 
consistent with comparisons 1-4 and 3-4. The delay of the dividend 
until after the equity announcement appears to be received more nega- 
tively than the delay of earnings. 
Tukey joint tests also confirm the above results. The mean abnormal 
return is not different when earnings precede equity offers (portfolios 
1 and 2) and earnings follow equity offers (portfolios 3 and 4). How- 
ever, the null hypothesis of no difference in abnormal returns is re- 
jected at the 5% level when dividends precede equity offers (portfolios 
1 and 3) versus observations where dividends follow equity offers 
(portfolios 2 and 4). 
A supplemental test is performed where tighter, or more restricted, 
pre- to postearnings and dividend announcement windows are exam- 
ined. This test uses only (i) equity issues that had either a prior divi- 
dend and earnings announcement within 30 trading days of the issue 
announcement and no subsequent dividend and earnings announce- 
ment for 30 trading days after the issue announcement or (ii) issues 
that subsequently announced dividend and earnings within 30 trading 
days after the issue announcement and did not announce dividend 
or earnings for 30 trading days before the issue announcement. This 
restriction reduces the sample size to 91 observations. The choice of 
30 days is somewhat arbitrary. Choosing a shorter interval such as 20 
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days reduces the sample size from 91 to 63 observations. The four 
portfolios then have too few observations to detect differences in ab- 
normal returns between portfolios. 
Results for the reduced sample indicate that comparisons 1-4 and 
3-4 are still significant at the 5% level, while all other comparisons are 
insignificant. Timing of earnings appears to have limited effect on the 
information content of equity issues, while dividend timing affects eq- 
uity offer abnormal returns. The abnormal return results are also com- 
pared with the findings of Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald. They 
report a weak statistical (albeit an economically significant) negative 
relationship between the length of time since the prior earnings release 
and the equity issue announcement. We calculate the number of trad- 
ing days between the prior earnings and dividend announcements and 
the equity announcement for the refined sample and estimate the fol- 
lowing regression model: 
SPEi = ot + IDBDPi, (4) 
where DBDPi for observation i is the minimum of (1) the number of 
trading days between the prior earnings announcement and the issue 
announcement or (2) the number of trading days between the prior 
dividend announcement and the issue announcement. The estimate of 
ot is negative and significant at the 5% level and the ,B estimate is 
significantly negative at the 1% level, indicating that the longer the 
time interval since the last information release, the greater the stock 
price decline associated with an equity offering. By incorporating the 
dividend announcement into the prior information set, we are able to 
find a much stronger statistical relationship than Korajczyk, Lucas, 
and McDonald between the interval since the last information release 
and the equity offer abnormal return. 
B. Signal Sequence and Straight Debt Announcement 
Abnormal Returns 
The results for the debt sample in panel A of table 5 are supportive of 
the sequential signaling hypothesis. The mean ARs for portfolios 1, 2, 
and 3 when D and/or X precede B are not significantly different from 
zero. In contrast, the mean AR for portfolio 4, where B is not partially 
revealed by either prior signal, is - 0.67% and is significant at the 1% 
level. An examination of portfolio medians provides similar results. 
In panel B of table 5, differences between mean ARs for the debt 
portfolios are presented. The comparisons 1-4, 2-4, and 3-4 are all 
negative and significant at the 5% level, while 1-3 is significant at the 
10% level. A prior announcement of earnings, dividends, or both leads 
to insignificant mean ARs associated with the announcement of a debt 
offering. The Tukey joint tests provide evidence that the differences 
in ARs are primarily due to the timing of the dividend announcements. 
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TABLE 5 Average Prediction Errors for Straight Debt Offers by Portfolio 
A. Portfolio Mean Abnormal Returns: Debt Offers 
D Precedes B D Follows B 
X precedes B Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 
Abnormal return (AR)a -.0011 -.0009 
X follows B Portfolio 3 Portfolio 4 
Abnormal return (AR)a - .0029 - .0067*** 
B. Comparisons of Portfolio Mean Abnormal Returns: Debt Offers 
Portfolio Comparisons 
1-2 1-3 1-4 
D[abnormal return]b .0002 -.0018* -.0056** 
Portfolio Comparisons 
2-3 2-4 3-4 
D [abnormal return] b -.0020 -.0058** -.0038*** 
NOTE.-Panel A presents the mean equity abnormal returns (ARs) for the sample of debt offerings 
broken down by portfolio sequence. Two-day unstandardized mean ARs are reported for the security 
announcements; however, all statistical tests involving ARs are performed using mean standardized 
prediction errors. Panel B compares the mean ARs for all possible pairwise portfolio combinations 
for the stock offerings. All cell entries in panel B represent the mean of the second portfolio value 
for the variable of interest less the mean of the first portfolio value in the numbered comparisons. 
a Medians tests were also constructed for the AR variables with no qualitative change in results. 
b The D[-] operator represents the difference between the means for the numbered portfolios for 
the variable in brackets. For example, the D[abnormal return] for the 1-4 comparison represents the 
mean abnormal return of portfolio 4 minus the mean abnormal return for portfolio 1. The sequential 
signaling hypothesis predicts the mean AR for portfolio 4 will be absolutely greater than the mean 
AR of portfolio 1. Since the mean AR for both portfolios are negative, the 1-4 comparison should 
be negative and significant. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
* Significant at the 1% level. 
This result is consistent with our evidence on equity offer announce- 
ments. Abnormal returns do not differ based on whether earnings pre- 
cede (portfolios 1 and 2) or follow (portfolios 3 and 4) debt offers. 
When dividends follow debt offers (portfolios 2 and 4), the debt offer 
announcement results in a significantly more negative mean AR than 
when dividends precede debt offers (portfolios 1 and 3). 
A supplemental test examines debt issues having less than 30-day 
"prior" versus less than 30-day "post" dividend and earnings an- 
nouncements. Results are qualitatively similar to the results in panel 
B of table 5, except the 1-3 comparison is no longer marginally sig- 
nificant. 
Equation (4) is also estimated for the refined debt sample. The esti- 
mated intercept is significantly positive and the slope estimate is sig- 
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nificantly negative (at the 5% and 1% level, respectively).'0 The debt 
offers SPEs are, on average, positive for short intervals of up to 15 
days, but decline with interval length. 
A plausible implication is that a signal-to-issue debt, if devoid of 
earnings and dividend information content, is received positively. In- 
vestors interpret the news that the firm is seeking debt financing less 
favorably the longer the time interval between the last information 
release and the debt offer announcement." Tests of differences in me- 
dians do not change the conclusions for either the debt or equity sam- 
ple.'2 
C. Signal Sequence and Dividend and Earnings Changes 
First, the positive and negative dividend and earnings changes are 
examined to determine whether the announcements are distributed 
evenly across the timing sequences. A two-way contingency table and 
a chi-square test are constructed to examine whether the sign of the 
dividend change is associated with the sequence of the dividend an- 
nouncement relative to the security announcement. Results are pre- 
sented in panel A of table 6. The null hypothesis of no association 
between the two partial sequences, D precedes B and D follows B, 
and the sign of the dividend change is rejected at the 5% level for the 
stock sample. There are a greater than expected number of negative 
dividend changes and fewer dividend increases when D follows B. 
Additionally, a greater than expected number of dividend increases 
and fewer dividend decreases occur when D precedes B. This result 
is consistent with managerial behavior implied by John and Williams 
(1985). The null hypothesis of no association cannot be rejected for 
the sample of debt issues in panel B of table 6. 
Test results of the association of the timing of X relative to B and 
the sign of the earnings change are presented in panels C and D of 
table 6. The null hypothesis of no association between the partial se- 
quences, X precedes B and X follows B, and the sign of Xu cannot be 
rejected for either the debt or stock samples. The lack of effect of 
the timing of the earnings signal provides supplemental evidence that 
10. Use of 20- and 10-day intervals for the debt sample does not affect conclusions. 
11. Equation (4) tests rest on a problematic assumption of the nature of information 
arrival. The linear functional form of eq. (4) implies that this is a joint test of signal 
timing and uniform information arrival over time. Major information revisions are likely 
to be more frequent in some periods and less frequent or absent in others. For example, 
Brous (1992) observes that analysts' earnings forecasts are typically updated infre- 
quently, usually some time after a major information release. Although we find a signifi- 
cant relationship with eq. (4) for both samples, the binary tests, such as the prior/ 
postclassification tests, are less restrictive and potentially more appropriate. 
12. In supplemental tests, the sign of earnings and dividend changes are not related 
to the offer SPE within each portfolio in either the debt or equity offer samples. The 
effect is apparently a timing phenomenon. 
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TABLE 6 Association of the Sign of Dividend and Earnings Changes to Timing 
of Announcements 
A. Dividends and Equity Announcements 
Sign of Dividend Change 
Timing - + 0 
D follows B 18 9 58 actual 
(12) (11) (62) (expected under null) 
D precedes B 9 15 82 actual 
(15) (13) (78) (expected under null) 
x2= 6.383, p-value = .0410 
B. Dividends and Debt Announcements 
Sign of Dividend Change 
Timing - + 0 
D follows B 13 35 183 actual 
(12) (38) (182) (expected under null) 
D precedes B 17 59 272 actual 
(18) (56) (273) (expected under null) 
X2 = .4455, insignificant p-value 
C. Earnings and Equity Announcements 
Sign of Earnings 
Change 
Timing - + 
X follows B 30 46 
(31) (47) 
X precedes B 45 68 
(44) (69) 
x2 = .035868, insignificant p-value 
D. Earnings and Debt Announcements 
Sign of Earnings 
Change 
Timing - + 
X follows B 117 122 
(118) (121) 
X precedes B 170 170 
(169) (171) 
X2 = .0614, insignificant p-value 
NOTE.-Panel A contains the signs of dividend changes disaggregated by dividends preceding and 
following equity announcements. Panel B contains the same information relative to dividends and 
debt announcements. Panel C presents the relationship of the sign of earnings changes to the timing 
of equity announcements while panel D holds the distribution of earnings changes to debt announce- 
ment timing. The numbers in parentheses represent the expected frequencies in each cell that would 
exist under the null of no impact from timing. 
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dividends are necessary to corroborate earnings, as in John and Wil- 
liams (1985). 
Table 7 compares the average dividend and earnings changes based 
on signal sequence. The tests of whether the Xu are significantly differ- 
ent from zero in panel A of table 7 are based on tests of median 
changes. The Brown Mood median test is used to test for significant 
differences in portfolio medians for the X variable in panel B of table 
7. On average, significant decreases in dividends occur only in portfo- 
lios 2 and 4 in panel A of table 7 for the stock sample. In portfolios 1 
and 3, where dividend releases precede the issue announcement, the 
average dividend change is insignificantly different from zero. An eq- 
uity issue announced before the dividend indicates a greater likelihood 
that the later announced dividend will be decreased. 
Comparisons between the portfolios in the equity sample also sub- 
stantiate the dividend timing phenomenon. Negative differences in the 
mean dividend changes are found in comparisons 1-2, 1-4 (significant 
at the 5% level), and 3-4 (significant at the 10% level) in the stock 
sample in panel B of table 7. On average, dividend decreases are larger 
when the dividend announcement is postponed until after the security 
issue announcement. 
The sign of comparison 2-3 leads to the same conclusion. When 
managers announce only earnings and not dividends before the secu- 
rity issue announcement, investors revise upward their expectations 
of the likelihood of a dividend decrease. Managers appear to postpone 
bad news until after the offering.'3 Investors also seem to be aware of 
this timing phenomenon. 
The significant mean dividend increase found in portfolio 3 relative 
to portfolio 1 of the stock sample also may represent managerial timing 
of dividend increases relative to the security announcement in order 
to ameliorate the negative effect of the issue before reporting a relative 
(nonsignificant) change in earnings of -2.38%. Investors appear to 
react as John and Williams (1985) suggest. 
Next, the effect of timing of earnings announcements relative to 
common stock issue announcements is considered. In panel A of table 
7, significant increases in earnings are found only in portfolios 1 and 
2. The earnings announcement precedes the issue announcement in 
these portfolios. However, the comparisons in panel B demonstrate 
that there are no significant differences in earnings changes regardless 
of the timing of the earnings announcement. The effect on the offer 
AR of delaying the earnings release is also not as negative as the effect 
13. The mean number of days from the announcement to the subsequent dividend 
(earnings) announcement after adjusting for outliers is 36 (33) days. Mikkelson and 
Partch (1986) report a median of 16 days from offer announcement o completion; hence, 
most offers are probably completed prior to the subsequent earnings and dividend an- 
nouncement. 
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TABLE 7 Average Dividend and Earnings Change around Equity 
and Debt Offers 
A. Portfolio Mean Dividend and Earnings Change: Debt and Equity 
D Precedes B D Follows B 
X precedes B Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 
Equity dividend change (D") -.0149 -.1016** 
Equity earnings change (X,,)a .1071*** .0707** 
Debt dividend change (DI') .0265 .0091 
Debt earnings change (XI') .0001 .0486 
X follows B Portfolio 3 Portfolio 4 
Equity dividend change (DU) .1636 -.0728** 
Equity earnings change (XU) .0833 .0920 
Debt dividend change (DU) .0299 .0029 
Debt earnings change (XU) -.0198 .0258 
B. Comparison of Portfolio Mean Dividend and Earnings Changes: 
Debt and Equity 
Portfolio Comparisons 
1-2 1-3 1-4 
D[equity dividend change]b - .0867** .1785* - .0579** 
D[equity earnings change] .0600 -.0238 -.0150 
D[debt dividend change] -.0174 .0034 -.0236 
D[debt earnings change] .0485 -.0199 .0259 
Portfolio Comparisons 
2-3 2-4 3-4 
D[equity dividend change]b .2652* .0288 - .2364* 
D[equity earnings change] .0126 .0213 .0087 
D[debt dividend change] .0208 -.00.62 -.0270 
D[debt earnings change] -.0684 -.0228 .0456 
NOTE.-Panel A presents the mean dividend (DU) and earnings (XU) changes broken down by 
portfolio sequence for the debt and equity offers. Panel B compares the mean dividend and earnings 
changes for all possible pairwise portfolio combinations. With four portfolios, there are six possible 
combinations taken two at a time. All cell entries in panel B represent the mean of the second 
portfolio value for the variable of interest less the mean of the first portfolio value in the numbered 
comparisons. 
a The calculation of Xu results in large outliers due to division by Xq -1, which are close to zero. 
This may distort means tests. The results in this table involving earnings utilize medians. Tests on 
Du and D[DU] using medians yield results qualitatively similar to those presented. We replicated the 
tests after eliminating dividend and earnings outliers; the significance levels of these variable drops 
slightly but no other material changes occur. I The D[E] operator represents the difference between the means for the numbered portfolios for 
the variable in brackets. For example, the DE ] for the 1-4 comparison represents the mean dividend 
or earnings change of portfolio 4 minus the mean dividend or earnings change for portfolio 1. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
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of postponing the dividend announcement.'4 For the debt sample, the 
mean dividend and earnings changes are insignificantly different from 
zero in all four portfolios, and there are no significant differences in 
the average dividend or earnings changes in any portfolio. 
V. Conclusions 
Investors react to security offers in a manner consistent with the impli- 
cations of signaling models provided by John and Williams (1985) and 
Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1991). Generally, the earlier the 
security issue announcement in the set of three announcements, the 
greater is its negative value effect. Managers should be aware that not 
only the signal content but also the timing of the signal affects how 
investors will react to a given information release. 
Most equity and straight debt issue announcements are made shortly 
after earnings and dividend releases. However, managers are more 
likely to announce an equity issue before a dividend decline. Regard- 
less of signal sequence, equity issue announcements are interpreted 
as bad news by investors. However, the abnormal return differences 
indicate that investors discount the stock price more heavily when 
the equity issue announcement precedes the dividend release. This 
justifiable response is related to a higher probability of receiving "bad" 
dividend news. This suggests a possible separating equilibrium be- 
tween better and weaker firms. Better performing firms seem to be 
able to differentiate themselves from weaker firms by announcing posi- 
tive or zero dividend changes prior to an equity offer announcement. 
Superior performing firms would then mitigate the agency costs arising 
from the lemons phenomenon proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984) 
by releasing current period cash flow information before the offer an- 
nouncement. 
This type of timing behavior is not observed around straight debt 
offer announcements. However, the information content of a debt offer 
announcement still does vary based on the sequence of signals. Sig- 
14. As a check on our assumption of a naive expectations model for earnings and 
dividends, we also estimated XI and DU by calculating the standardized abnormal returns 
for the dividend and earnings announcements. Using ordinary least squares, we tested 
whether these proxy measures of the unexpected earnings and dividends differed among 
the portfolios. No significant differences were found. This is consistent with an efficient 
market. This implies that the timing of security offering announcements provides the 
distinguishing value affecting marginal information in this set of three signals. We also 
tested for differences in informativeness using the absolute value of the standardized 
dividend and earnings ARs and found no difference. Compared to table 7 results, how- 
ever, we should have at least found a significant positive AR for earnings in portfolio 1 
if our observed table 7 unexpected earnings were truly unexpected by investors. Possi- 
bly, the greater noise in the AR measure may contribute to the difference in results. 
Similar to Loderer and Mauer (1992), we found no relationship between signal sequence 
and Miller and Rock's net dividend measure. 
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nificant negative abnormal returns occur for straight debt offers only 
when the offer announcement closely precedes both the current earn- 
ings and dividend releases. 
Appendix 
Partially Revealing Signals in a Miller and Rock Environment 
We first examine the signaling problem in a single-period decision environment 
with investment (I) known, similar to the case presented in the Miller and 
Rock (1985) model. This framework is useful because it provides a simple 
structure for establishing the conditional informativeness of a given announce- 
ment such as dividends or earnings. In their model, the dividend announce- 
ment (D) and the external financing announcement (B) are implicitly revealed 
simultaneously. The revelation of either D or B alone provides no information 
until the second signal is received. Since investment is known, the two signals 
allow investors to deduce earnings (X) via the cash flow identity. In reality, 
firms often do not simultaneously announce D and B. We hypothesize that the 
occurrence of either signal alone modifies the expectations concerning the 
remaining signal(s). 
Prior to any announcements (time 0), the expected sources and uses of a 
firm are given by 
Eo(XI I = Eo (DI ) - E0(BI ), (Al) 
where E0Q) is the time 0 expectation of (0) conditional on some prior informa- 
tion set +. All announcements will be disclosed by the end of the investment 
period T. Reformulating equation (Al) in terms of unexpected changes yields 
xu = Du - Bu, (A2) 
for i = 1, 2, . .. , N, where i represents a possible announcement date of the 
N possible announcement dates to and including T. Over the N possible dates, 
there is one announcement each of X, D, or B. The superscript u represents 
the shift in the expected value Ei(-) - Ei_-10, for X, D, or B, at date e. 
Although management may receive information at any time, asymmetrically 
informed investors revise expected values only when X, D, or B are an- 
nounced. 
Proceeding in this modified Miller and Rock framework, partially revealing 
information on earnings occurs when the signals D or B (but not both) precede 
X. These sequences include (D - X- B), (D - [XB]), (B - X- D), and (B - [XD]), 
where the brackets enclose simultaneous announcements. An examination of 
the first two cases where the dividend announcement precedes the earnings 
announcement is sufficient to clarify the notion of partially revealing signals. 
With an announcement of dividends at time i, 
Du = Xu + Bu, (A3) 
where Du is now known. The sources and uses identity is only maintained if 
xu = 8Du (A4) 
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and 
Bu = (1 - 5)DU (A5) 
where 8 represents the proportion of the unexpected dividend attributed to an 
unexpected shift in earnings and (1 - 8) represents the proportion attributed 
to an unexpected shift in external financing. Thus, both a shift in earnings 
expectations, Xu, and a shift in expectations of external financing, Bu, will 
occur for 8 not equal to zero or one. The lower the 8, the greater the respon- 
siveness of Bu to an unexpected change in dividends. With an announced 
change in earnings, equation (A2) holds where 
Du = TXU (A6) 
and 
Bu = -(1 - T)Xu. (A7) 
Our empirical tests determine if (1 - 8) and (1 - T) differ from zero. The 8(T) 
could shift over time in a multiperiod framework, as long as 5(T) does not 
equal zero or unity, preceding dividend or earnings announcements would 
partially reveal Bu. The single-period assumption considered here is violated 
by firms that have lives that extend beyond the current period. In this case, 
the final signal in the sequence would not be redundant since the announce- 
ment will still provide information about future expected cash flows. Conse- 
quently, the last signal in the sequence may still have a valuation effect. 
The partially revealing signal concept may also be easily applied to an envi- 
ronment where investment is unknown. Prior to any announcements, the con- 
ditional expectations of B, D, X, and I are based on some common information 
set +. Let the first announcement in the sequence be X. The announcement 
of earnings will potentially affect the conditional expectations of the remaining 
signals by adding to the information set +. Originally, the expectation of B 
(E[B I +]) is conditional only on +. After the earnings announcement, the condi- 
tional expectation of B is now E[B I +, X]. In this case, Xu = DU - BU + Iu 
must hold to preserve the cash flow identity. It must also be true that Du = 
w,Xu, -Bu = w2XU, and Iu = w3XU, where Ewi = 1. More important, the 
sequential timing hypothesis would still hold. 
Kane, Lee, and Marcus (1984) and Healy and Palepu (1988) provide evi- 
dence that 8 (or T) is nonzero for the case of earnings and dividend announce- 
ments since they find that these two announcements provide corroborative 
information. If (1 - T) is nonzero, the announcement date abnormal return 
associated with B will differ based on whether X has been previously an- 
nounced. In this framework, the abnormal return associated with the security 
announcement is conditionally dependent on the occurrence of other informa- 
tion releases. 
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